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Abstract
The paper presents an empirical analysis of education policy in England that is 
informed by recent developments in US critical theory. In particular, I draw on 
‘whiteness studies’ and the application of Critical Race Theory (CRT). These 
perspectives offer a new and radical way of conceptualising the role of racism in 
education. Although the US literature has paid little or no regard to issues outside 
North America, I argue that a similar understanding of racism (as a multifaceted, 
deeply embedded, often taken-for-granted aspect of power relations) lies at the heart 
of recent attempts to understand institutional racism in the UK. Having set out the 
conceptual terrain in the first half of the paper, I then apply this approach to recent 
changes in the English education system to reveal the central role accorded the 
defence (and extension) of race inequity. Finally, the paper touches on the question of 
racism and intentionality: although race inequity may not be a planned and deliberate 
goal of education policy neither is it accidental. The patterning of racial advantage 
and inequity is structured in domination and its continuation represents a form of tacit  
intentionality on the part of white powerholders and policy makers. It is in this sense 
that education policy is an act of white supremacy. Following others in the CRT 
tradition, therefore, the paper’s analysis concludes that the most dangerous form of 
‘white supremacy’ is not the obvious and extreme fascistic posturing of small neo-
nazi groups, but rather the taken-for-granted routine privileging of white interests that 
goes unremarked in the political mainstream.
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INTRODUCTION: problems & perspectives
‘As I write, I try to remember when the word racism ceased to be the term 
which best expressed for me exploitation of black people and other people of 
color in this society and when I began to understand that the most useful term 
was white supremacy’ (hooks 1989: 112). 
In this paper I consider the role of education policy in the active structuring of racial 
inequity. Like bell hooks, my analysis centres on a conceptualisation of ‘white 
supremacy’ that goes beyond the usual narrow focus on extreme and explicitly racist 
organistions. Rather, this analysis focuses on a more extensive, more powerful version 
of white supremacy; one that is normalized and taken for granted. Before examining 
the evidence for the contemporary manifestation of white supremacist thought, it may 
be useful to draw on an historical example that helps to set the scene. 
Marcus Wood’s book ‘Blind Memory’ examines the visual representation of slavery in 
England and America during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century. He begins by 
commenting on the case of Thomas Clarkson’s ‘Abolition Map’. Produced in 1808, 
the ‘map’ was an attempt to chart visually the relationships between all the important 
people and events involved in bringing about the abolition of slavery. As Wood states, 
the map represents ‘a cartographic fantasy which presents abolition as a series of 
tributary streams and rivers, each with the name of a supposed abolitionist attached. 
The waterways unite to form two mighty rivers in England and America, and these in 
turn unite when they flow into the open sea, presumably the sea of emancipation and 
spiritual renewal’ (Wood 2000: 1 & 4). Incredibly, not a single slave was mentioned 
in this ‘map’. 
Clarkson’s map provides an object-lesson in the re-imagining of history to present a 
unified tale of the triumph of white civilizing values over the forces of repression. The 
erasure of Black people,[1] as an active and ultimately irresistible force for change, is 
both obscene and significant. In a similar fashion policy makers (and many 
educationists) tend to imagine education policy as evolving over time, sometimes with 
dramatic changes in focus, but always (so policy makers assure us) with the best of 
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intentions for all. This sanitised (white-washed) version of history envisions policy as 
a rational process of change, with each step building incrementally on its predecessor 
in a more-or-less linear and evolutionary fashion. But such an approach is contrary to 
the reality of race and politics in England where virtually every major public policy 
meant to improve race equity has arisen directly from resistance and protest by Black 
and other minoritized communities. Indeed, some of the most significant changes 
have come about as the result of bloodshed. The most recent example of this is the far 
reaching changes made to race equity legislation (affecting all public institutions and 
every state maintained school) in the wake of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry  
(Macpherson 1999). This Inquiry was only established after years of campaigning by 
Doreen and Neville Lawrence in an attempt to bring to justice the white youths who 
had murdered their 18 year old son as he waited for a London Bus (and was necessary 
because of the failure of the police force - which treated the Lawrences more like 
troublemakers than grieving parents). Another notable example in the field of 
education policy is the establishment, in 1979, of a committee of inquiry into the 
education of minority ethnic children following growing protests by Black community 
groups (e.g. Redbridge Community Relations Council 1978) and activists (e.g. Coard 
1971; Dhondy 1974 & 1978). Similarly, ‘multicultural’ education enjoyed a brief 
boost to its policy profile following uprisings in Brixton, Bristol and elsewhere in the 
early 1980s (see Virdee & Cole 2000;  Figueroa 2004).
There is a pressing need, therefore, to view policy in general, and education policy in 
particular, through a lens that recognises the very real struggles and conflicts that lie 
at the heart of the processes through which policy and practice are shaped. This is a 
radical challenge that calls into question many of the comforting myths that self-
avowedly ‘democratic’ states tell about themselves. But the challenge extends beyond 
the realms of policy making and policy-implementation, and reaches into the 
academy. In particular, such a perspective challenges the kind of ‘problem solving’ 
approach that has come to typify a great deal of academic work, especially in the 
traditions of school effectiveness and management/leadership studies (see Morley & 
Rassool 1999). Here, in the words of Thrupp and Willmott (2003: 4) commonsense 
‘ahistorical, individuated and often monocultural views about the purposes and 
problems of schooling’ feed into a kind of uncritical ‘policy science’ (after Grace 
1995) that seeks school-based solutions to school-based problems and totally ignores 
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existing structural and historic relations of domination. Roger Dale (2001) has 
criticised a similar tendency in English Sociology of Education where, as Rob Moore 
argued, a weak sociology for education (rather than a sociology of education) has 
sometimes focused on ‘the internal features of the system … tending to “take” its 
problems rather than “make” problems through the external criteria of critical social 
theory’ (Moore 1996: 158). As Geoff Whitty (2002) has documented, the election of a 
‘New Labour’ government in 1997 did nothing to challenge the existing aggressively 
managerialist policy culture and academic research melieu. As several writers have 
argued, notably Michael Apple (1996), Stephen Ball (2004) and Sara Delamont 
(2001), there is no such thing as the sociology of education. There are competing (and 
excluding) versions and constructions of the discipline, even within a single time 
period in a single nation state. 
 
The line of analysis pursued in this paper, therefore, may seem radical (perhaps even 
insane)[2] but it builds on a growing tradition of critical race scholarship that is 
especially strong in the US (Crenshaw et al 1995; Essed & Goldberg 2002; Delgado 
& Stefancic 2000, 2001; Ladson-Billings  1998;  Ladson-Billings & Tate 1995; 
Parker 1998). By applying these perspectives to the English case I hope, first, to 
illuminate some of the deeper problems and conflicts at the heart of education policy 
and race inequity, and second, to contribute to the ‘iterative project of scholarship and 
social justice’ aspired to by Critical Race Theory (Tate 1997: 234-5).
The main focus of the paper is a reconceptualisation of white supremacy and an 
examination of the empirical evidence in contemporary English education policy. In 
particular, I examine some fundamental questions about who and what education 
policy is for? Before looking at the empirical data, however, it is necessary to set out 
my understanding of whiteness and the construction of white identities.
TROUBLING WHITENESS[3]
‘whiteness is not a culture but a social concept’ (Leonardo 2002: 32)
As Rosa Hernandez Sheets (2000; 2003) has argued, focusing on white people (their 
sense of self, their interests and concerns) has become such a fashionable past-time 
5
within parts of the US academy that there is a danger of whiteness studies colonizing 
and further de-radicalising multicultural education. However, the field is extremely 
wide. If the guilt-ridden white introspection that Sheets fears is at one end of the 
spectrum, at the other pole lie Marxist analyses that firmly identify whiteness as one 
more ‘strategy for securing to some an advantage in a competitive society’ (Ignatiev 
1997: 1). The latter position calls for the ‘abolition of the white race’:
‘Various commentators have stated that their aim is to identify and preserve a 
positive white identity. Abolitionists deny the existence of a positive white 
identity. We at Race Traitor, the journal with which I am associated, have 
asked some of those who think whiteness contains positive elements to 
indicate what they are. We are still waiting for an answer. Until we get one, 
we will take our stand with David Roediger, who has insisted that whiteness is 
not merely oppressive and false, it is nothing but oppressive and false.’ 
(Ignatiev 1997: 1)[4]
Alastair Bonnett has argued that this position is considerably weakened by its 
‘obsessive focus’ on the US and a ‘persistent romanticisation of blackness’ that leads 
the abolitionist position to a form of class reductionism that is unable to deal with the 
complexities of racism in a more nuanced way that takes account of experiences 
elsewhere in the world (Bonnett 2000: 141). One attempt to find a critical, but not 
class reductionist, approach to these issues is to be found in the work of Zeus 
Leonardo (2002; 2004). Leonardo appropriates concepts from critical pedagogy, 
globalization studies and whiteness studies, to argue for a ‘neo-abolitionist’ position.
Leonardo begins by addressing a key problematic in this field; the difference between 
‘whiteness’ and ‘white people’:
‘“Whiteness” is a racial discourse, whereas the category “white people” 
represents a socially constructed identity, usually based on skin 
color.’(Leonardo 2002: 31)
This is a vital point. Critical scholarship on whiteness is not an assault on white 
people per se: it is an assault on the socially constructed and constantly reinforced 
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power of white identifications and interests (see Ladson-Billings & Tate 1995: 58-60). 
‘So-called “White” people’ (Bonnett 1997: 189) do not necessarily reinforce 
whiteness any more than heterosexual people are necessary homophobic, or men are 
necessarily sexist. However, these analogies are useful because they highlight the 
forces that recreate and extend the kinds of ‘unthinking’ assumptions and actions 
which mean that very many (probably the majority) of heterosexuals are homophobic 
and most men are sexist. It is possible for white people to take a real and active role in 
deconstructing whiteness but such ‘race traitors’ are relatively uncommon. 
Building on a range of work, in particular Ruth Frankenberg (1993) and David 
Roediger (1992), Leonardo discusses some of the defining characteristics of 
whiteness. For example: 
• ‘an unwillingness to name the contours of racism  ’ : inequity (in 
employment, education, wealth etc) is explained by reference to any 
number of alternative factors rather than being attributable to the actions of 
whites;
• ‘the avoidance of identifying with a racial experience or group  ’: 
whiteness draws much of its power from ‘Othering’ the very idea of 
ethnicity. A central characteristic of whiteness is a process of 
‘naturalisation’ such that white becomes the norm from which other 
‘races’ stand apart and in relation to which they are defined. When white-
identified groups do make a claim for a white ethnic identity alongside 
other officially recognised ethnic groups (e.g. as has been tried by the Ku 
Klux Klan in the US and the British National Party in England) it is the 
very exceptionality of such claims that points to the commonsense 
naturalization of whiteness at the heart of contemporary political discourse 
(see Ratcliffe 2004: 115-117; Swain & Nieli 2003).
• ‘the minimization of racist legacy  ’ : seeking to ‘draw a line’ under past 
atrocities as if that would negate their continued importance as historic, 
economic and cultural factors.
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This is not to say that whiteness is stable nor unambiguous. Indeed, some of the most 
striking scholarship in this field has taken as its focus the historically specific, 
contingent and ‘slippery’ nature of whiteness (Bonnett 1997). For centuries legislators 
have struggled to capture the ‘commonsense’ understandings of race in terms that 
could be legally enforced (see Ladson-Billings 2004; Wright 1995). In addition, many 
groups that at one time or another have been defined as outside whiteness have at 
other times been redefined and brought within the privileged group. See, for example, 
Karen Brodkin Sacks (1994) How Did Jews Become White Folks? and Noel Ignatiev 
(1995) How the Irish Became White.
Whiteness as Performatively Constituted
In critical scholarship it is not uncommon to hear whiteness described as a 
performance. Leonardo (2002: 31), for example, cites Henry Giroux (1997) in exactly 
this way. Describing whiteness as a performance can operate as a short-hand means of 
drawing attention to the importance of actions and constructed identities – rejecting 
the simplistic assumption that ‘whiteness’ and ‘white people’ are one and the same 
thing:
‘the critical project that largely informs the new scholarship on “whiteness” 
rests on a singular assumption. Its primary aim is to unveil the rhetorical, 
political, cultural, and social mechanisms through which “whiteness” is both 
invented and used to mask its power and privilege.’ (Giroux  1997: 102)
However, at risk of seeming pedantic, there is an important distinction to be made 
here between performance and performativity: it is a distinction that directly addresses 
the power of whiteness and the problems in decentring it.
The idea of likening social ‘actors’ to performers on a stage is far from novel. One of 
the most insightful analyses remains that connected with the Chicago school of 
symbolic interaction, especially in the work of Howard Becker and Erving Goffman. 
The latter, of course, took the analogy as far as describing an entire dramaturgical 
analysis of social interaction, including ‘performers’, ‘communication out of 
character’ and ‘front-’ and ‘back’ regions, where actors allow different (often 
contradictory) faces to be seen by particular associates (Goffman 1959). However, 
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one of the problems with such an analysis is the degree to which performers are aware 
of the performance they are giving. One of the most powerful and dangerous aspects 
of whiteness is that many (possibly the majority) of white people have no awareness 
of whiteness as a construction, let alone their own role in sustaining and playing out 
the inequities at the heart of whiteness. In this sense, the dramaturgical over-tones of 
the analysis actually under-estimate   the size of the task facing critical antiracists. As 
Deborah Youdell argues:
‘The terms “perform” and “performance” imply a volitional subject, even a 
self-conscious, choosing performer, behind the “act” which is performed.’ 
(Youdell 2000: 64)
Building on writers like Michel Foucault (1980; 1990; 1991) and Judith Butler (1990; 
1993; 1997), Youdell argues for a particular understanding of how power operates on 
and through the creation of different subject identities. Through a meticulously 
documented and highly sensitive analysis of teenage identity-work in school, Youdell 
takes seriously the spaces and possibilities for resistance and subversion. Crucially, 
however, her analysis also demonstrates the numerous ways in which certain 
identities are strengthened and legitimized through countless acts of reiteration and 
reinforcement. These processes are not foolproof but their power is enormous, 
extending even into the most intimate and apparently idiosyncratic of actions and 
relationships, including, for example, the particular constellations of heterosexual 
desire that are deemed possible across race lines in school (Youdell 2003).  Youdell 
terms this the performative constitution of identity.
It is this performative constitution of particular identities and roles that lends 
whiteness its deep-rooted, almost invisible status. One of the key points about 
whiteness as a performatively constituted identity is that those who are implicated in 
whiteness rarely even realize its existence – let alone their own role in its repeated 
iteration and re-signification.
In the next section of this paper I want to take the key conceptual insights discussed 
above and apply them to the field of education policy and race inequity in England. I 
view this work as building on two key conceptual pillars: an understanding of Critical 
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Race Theory that includes elements of critical antiracism elaborated outside the US 
(Bonnett 2000; Dei, Karumanchery & Karumanchery-Luik 2004; Gillborn 1995; 
2004a; 2004b) and critical white studies, including in particular a notion of whiteness 
as performatively constituted in numerous discursive arenas including the realms of 
education policy and classroom practice. 
SEEING SUPREMACY
‘Whiteness has developed, over the past two hundred years, into a taken-for-
granted experience structured upon a varying set of supremacist assumptions 
(sometimes cultural, sometimes biological, sometimes moral, sometimes all 
three). Non-White identities, by contrast, have been denied the privileges of 
normativity, and are marked within the West as marginal and inferior’. 
(Bonnett 1997: 188)
Critical Race Theory promotes a different perspective on white supremacy than the 
limited and extreme understandings usually denoted by the term in everyday 
language. ‘White supremacy’ is a term usually reserved for individuals, organisations 
and/or philosophies that are overtly and self-consciously racist in the most crude and 
obvious way: organisations that not only claim a distinctiveness for white-identified 
people, but add a social Darwinist element to argue for intellectual and/or cultural 
superiority, frequently based on a supposedly fixed genetic inheritance. Even after the 
genocide of the Nazi era in the previous century, such perspectives continue to be 
openly preached by some.[5] On both sides of the Atlantic, however, it is interesting 
that groups whose neo-nazi pedigree is secure (like the British National Party and the 
Ku Klux Klan) have recently tried to re-invent themselves as slicker, more media 
astute organisations, calling for a supposed re-alignment of policy goals and interests 
to favour the white majority ‘ethnic’ group and denying that their fascistic past has 
any relevance to their contemporary activities. It should also be remembered that, 
although mainstream science long-ago rejected crude notions of racial genetic 
separateness and superiority (Selden 1999), it is exactly these beliefs which shaped 
Herrnstein & Murray’s  (1994) foray into the New York Times   bestseller list.[6] 
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Such extreme and obviously racist positions are highly dangerous but they are by no 
means the whole story. Indeed, there is a danger that their influence on debate risks 
obscuring a far more comprehensive and subtle form of race politics – one that 
actually exerts a more powerful influence. As Paul Gilroy argued, in relation to the 
British case, more than a decade ago:
‘A tension exists between those strands in antiracism which are primarily 
antifascist and those which work with a more extensive and complex sense of 
what racism is in contemporary Britain … The price of over-identifying the 
struggle against racism with the activities of these extremist groups and 
grouplets is that however much of a problem they may be in a particular area 
(and I am not denying the need to combat their organizing) they are 
exceptional. They exist on the fringes … A more productive starting point is 
provided by focusing on racism in the mainstream and seeing “race” and 
racism not as fringe questions but as a volatile presence at the very centre of 
British politics, actively shaping and determining the history not simply of 
blacks, but of this country as a whole…’ (Gilroy 1992: 51)
Critical work on race in the US has moved beyond the ‘commonsense’ superficial 
readings of white supremacy as solely the preserve of obviously extreme racialized 
politics. Some scholars have penetrated even further the façade of contemporary 
politics, to argue that mainstream political parties, and the functioning of agencies like 
the education system itself, are actively implicated in maintaining and extending the 
grip that white people have on the major sources of power in ‘Western’ capitalist 
societies. 
‘[By] “white supremacy” I do not mean to allude only to the self-conscious 
racism of white supremacist hate groups. I refer instead to a political, 
economic, and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control power 
and material resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of white superiority 
and entitlement are widespread, and relations of white dominance and non-
white subordination are daily reenacted across a broad array of institutions and 
social settings.’ (Ansley 1997: 592)
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Of course, this is not to argue that white people are uniformily powerful, as Noel 
Ignatiev has argued in relation to poverty among whites; ‘whiteness does not exempt 
people from exploitation, it reconciles them to it. It is for those who have nothing 
else’ (Ignatiev 1997: 1). The growing influence of Critical Race Theory has supported 
this line of analysis but it is a perspective that was present before the advent of CRT 
in education (see Sleeter 1993). For example, this paper began with a quotation from 
bell hooks who, writing in the late 1980s, used the term to explicitly critique a central 
and extensive form of racism that evades the simplistic definitions of liberal 
discourse. In particular, hooks identifies white supremacy as a deeply rooted exercise 
of power that remains untouched by moves to address the more obvious forms of 
overt discrimination:
‘When liberal whites fail to understand how they can and/or do embody white-
supremacist values and beliefs even though they may not embrace racism as 
prejudice or domination (especially domination that involves coercive 
control), they cannot recognize the ways their actions support and affirm the 
very structure of racist domination and oppression that they profess to wish to 
see eradicated’ (hooks 1989: 113).
This perspective echoes precisely the same critique of liberalism that prompted the 
genesis of Critical Race Theory in legal scholarship. 
‘CRT begins with a number of basic insights. One is that racism is normal, not 
aberrant, in American society. Because racism is an ingrained feature of our 
landscape, it looks ordinary and natural to persons in the culture. Formal equal 
opportunity – rules and laws that insist on treating blacks and whites (for 
example) alike – can thus remedy only the more extreme and shocking forms 
of injustice, the ones that do stand out. It can do little about the business-as-
usual forms of racism that people of color confront every day and that account 
for much misery, alienation, and despair’ (Delgado & Stefancic 2000: xvi)
In the remainder of this paper I work from this critical perspective to explore how 
contemporary English education policy plays an active role in supporting and 
affirming exactly these kinds of racist inequities and structures of oppression.[7]
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WHO AND WHAT IS EDUCATION POLICY FOR?
In previous sections of this paper I have stressed the importance of looking beyond 
the superficial rhetoric of policies and practices, in order to focus on the material and 
ideological work that is done to legitimate and extend race inequity. When judging 
education policy, therefore, it is pertinent to ask some deceptively simple questions. In 
view of the restrictions of available space, I will structure the discussion in relation to 
three questions that directly address the material consequences of education policy. 
These are by no means the only relevant ‘tests’ of equity and policy but they among 
the most revealing and fundamental because they go beyond the expressed intent of 
policy makers and practitioners to examine how policy works in the real world. First, 
the question of priorities: who or what is driving education policy? Second, the 
question of beneficiaries: who wins and who loses as a result of education policy 
priorities? And finally, the question of outcomes: what are the effects of policy? I will 
address each question in turn.
Priority
As several studies have shown, over the last half-century issues of racism, ‘race 
relations’ and ‘race’ equity have featured differently in education policy. From early 
post-War ignorance and neglect (Lynch 1986), through periods of overt 
assimilationist and integrationist policies (Mullard 1982; Tomlinson 1977), it has been 
clear that, although the particular measures meant to address ethnic diversity have 
changed from time to time, one constant feature has been a place on the margins of 
education policy. Superficially there have been significant changes. For example, 
during much of the 1980s and 1990s successive Conservative administrations - 
reflecting Margaret Thatcher’s famous assertion that there is ‘no such thing as 
society’ (Thatcher 1993: 626) - insisted that  the only fair approach was a ‘colour-
blind’ perspective that denied any legitimacy to group-based analyses and claims. 
John Major, who succeeded Thatcher as Prime Minister, asserted:
‘Life is lived, people join in, people belong. Darkness, lightness – that’s a 
difference losing significance with every day crossed off the calender … Few 
things would inflame racial tension more than trying to bias systems in favour 
of one colour – a reverse discrimination that fuels resentment. An artificial 
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bias would damage the harmony we treasure. Equality under the law – yes; 
equality of opportunity and reward – yes. These promote harmony. Policy 
must be colour blind – it must just tackle disadvantage. Faced by British 
citizens, whatever their background might be.’  (Major 1997: 6-7). 
Major’s determination to refuse the significance of raced inequality (reducing ‘race’ 
to ‘darkness’ and ‘lightness’)  was highly significant. The sub-text of his attack on 
‘[a]n artificial bias’ would seem to have been an acceptance of some form of non-
artificial (natural?) bias. In a stark reversal of this language, Tony Blair’s incoming 
‘New Labour’ administration of 1997 openly named race inequity as an unacceptable 
feature of the education system and even cited critical research that had raised 
questions about teachers’ role in producing raced inequities in school (DfEE 1997). 
Unfortunately, the tangible outcomes of this approach have mostly concerned granting 
funding to a handful of minority ethnic schools on the basis of a distinctive religious 
identity, e.g. creating the first state-funded Muslim schools (see Gillborn 1998 & 
2001; Figueroa 2004). 
A particularly stark indicator of the place of race equity in contemporary education 
policy is provided by the Department for Education’s ‘five year strategy’ published 
amid a flurry of publicity in the summer of 2004. Running to more than 100 pages, 
the document set out Labour’s proposals for the next five years of education policy. 
‘Minority ethnic’ pupils are granted a single mention in the text; a 25 word paragraph 
headed ‘ low achieving minority ethnic groups  ’  (DfES 2004: 60). The word ‘racism’ 
does not appear at all; neither do the more santized concepts of ‘prejudice’ and 
‘discrimination’. In contrast, ‘business’ and ‘businesses’ appear 36 times, and 
‘standards’ appears on 65 separate occasions: the latter equates to an average 
reiteration of ‘standards’ once every page and a half. Clearly, the five year strategy 
prioritized an official version of ‘standards’ in education, but one could legitimately 
ask ‘standards for whom’? 
Regardless of the political persuasion of the incumbent political party, therefore, race 
equity has constantly to fight for legitimacy as a significant topic for education policy 




Since 1988 education policy in England, under both Conservative and Labour 
governments, has been driven by the assertion that ‘standards’ are too low 
and must be raised. The dominant measure of standards has been through 
crude quantitative data, in particular, students’ performance in high-stakes 
tests conducted at the end of their primary and secondary education. These 
data are published nationally in tabular form and provide a misleading, but 
easily reproduced, guide to school ‘standards’.[8] These reforms have 
fundamentally altered how schools operate, placing a premium on those 
subjects that will count in the school tests [9] and leading to increased 
selection and separation of students who are thought to be ‘academic’ in 
secondary schools (more on this below).
A good performance in the official statistics is extremely important for schools: 
continual ‘under-performance’ can trigger a range of sanctions including, 
ultimately, school closure. Not surprisingly, therefore, the proportion of 16 year-
olds attaining the requisite five ‘higher grade passes’ in their high-stakes 
examinations has consistently risen since the late 1980s. However, students of 
minority ethnic backgrounds have not always shared equally in these gains.[10] In 
fact, of the five principal ethnic categories monitored continuously since the late 
1980s, only one group – whites – have enjoyed consistent year-on-year 
improvement. The proportion of whites attaining the ‘benchmark’ level (at least 
five higher grade passes) has risen from 30% in 1989 to 55% in 2004 (DfES 
2005: table A). Each of the other ‘ethnic’ groups counted in official statistics 
have experienced periods where their rate of success has held constant (as in the 
case of Indian students between 2000 and 2002) or even where their success rate 
has fallen back, e.g. Black students in 1992-1994, and between 2000 and 2004; 
Pakistani students between 1992 and 1996, and between 2002 and 2004; and 
Bangladeshi students in 1998-2000 (DfES 2005).
On the whole, therefore, minoritized students have not shared equally in the improved 
attainments associated with the recent reforms. In particular, ‘Black’ students find 
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themselves even further behind their white counterparts than they were in the 1980s: 
in 1989, 30% of white students achieved five or more higher grade passes, compared 
with 18% of Black students (an inequity of 12 percentage points); in 2004, however, 
the gap was 20 percentage points (with the benchmark being attained by 55% of white 
students and 35% of their Black peers: DfES 2005: table A). Similarly, Pakistani 
students (who were 11 percentage points behind whites in 1992) have experienced 
widening inequities of attainment in recent years: in 2004, 37% of Pakistani students 
reached the required level, i.e. a gap of 18 percentage points behind whites.
A great deal of official attention is often focused on pupils categorized as of ‘Indian’ 
ethnic heritage: this group was first recognised separately in official statistics in 1992, 
when 38% attained the benchmark level of success. Since then, Indian students have 
generally enjoyed greater success than the white group: with 72% achieving at least 
five higher grade passes in the most recent survey. This level of attainment is often 
highlighted in official press releases and in media coverage:
Minority Ethnic Pupils Make Further Progress at GCSE (DfES Press Release, 
24 February 2005)
Indeed, the attainment of Indian pupils (along with their other ‘Asian’ peers) is 
frequently cited as evidence that the system rewards effort and that under achievement 
can have nothing to do with racism (neither overt nor unintended):
‘I’m no educationist, but if you examine the statistics it is certainly difficult to 
conclude that our schools discriminate against ethnic minorities, even 
unwittingly. Chinese and some other Asian pupils excel, easily outperforming 
the whites.’ (Rod Liddle, ‘It’s not race that keeps black boys back’, Sunday 
Times, 13 March 2005).
Much has been written in the US about how certain groups are held up as ‘model 
minorities’, a stereotype of hard work and success that harms both the group itself (by 
obscuring certain other disadvantages, such as higher rates of unemployment) and, by 
implication, other less successful groups (whose ‘failure’, it is reasoned, must surely 
be their own fault): see Min (2004) and Takaki (1993). This literature is less well 
developed in the UK but qualitative research has already established that racism in 
schools works differently for different ethnic groups (see Youdell 2000; 2003). A 
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more detailed examination of Indian and Chinese attainments is beyond the scope of 
the present paper, suffice it to say that their examination success evidences nothing 
about an absence of racism in their school experiences (see Archer & Francis 2005 & 
forthcoming; Bhatti 2004). Furthermore, their relative success should not distract 
from the much less positive picture that emerges for the other minority groups 
counted in official data (above).
Outcomes
A major reason for the different patterns of improvement shown by different groups is 
likely to lie in the ways that schools have responded to the pressure to ‘raise 
standards’. There is anecdotal evidence, for example, which suggests that some 
schools have sought to limit the proportion of minority students they admit and to 
expel disproportionate numbers of Black students. By their very nature, such practices 
elude official documentation and scrutiny, but it is certainly the case that Black 
students continue to be significantly more likely to be expelled from school than their 
white peers (as they have since records began: DfES 2002) and that Black students are 
frequently treated more harshly than whites accused of similar offences – a pattern 
long established in British qualitative research (Blair 2001; Connolly 1998; Figueroa 
1991; Gillborn 1990; Gillborn & Youdell 2000; Mac an Ghaill 1988; Mirza 1992 & 
1999; Nehaul 1996; Sewell 1998; Wright 1987 & 1992; Wright et al 2000) and now 
even identified in official school inspection data.[11] 
It is also clear that schools are increasingly using ‘setting by ability’ and other forms 
of internal selection to separate children into hierarchical teaching groups. This kind 
of development is openly advocated by government. For example, the Labour Party’s 
1997 election manifesto claimed that setting benefits both high- and low-achieving 
students (Labour Party 1997: 7), something that is directly contradicted by the 
international research evidence.[12] In addition, subsequent policies have further 
extended this principle by first, creating advantaged pathways for those designated as 
‘gifted and talented’, and second, by increasing the number of specialist schools, each 
with increased provision to choose pupils according to ‘aptitude’ and/or ‘ability’(see 
Edwards & Tomlinson 2002).  Wholly predictably, in view previous research on the 
racialised nature of selection to ‘gifted’ programmes, evidence is already emerging 
that certain minority groups, especially Black students, are markedly under-
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represented in special provision for the so-called ‘gifted and talented’ (Ofsted 2004: 
6).
One of the most consistent findings in research on school-based selection processes is 
that, when asked to judge the potential, attitude and/or motivation of their students, 
white teachers tend to place disproportionate numbers of Black students in low ranked 
groups (CRE 1992; Gillborn & Gipps 1996;  Hallam & Toutounji 1996; Sukhnandan 
& Lee 1998). These decisions frequently have a cumulative effect whereby the initial 
decision compounds inequity upon inequity until success can become, literally, 
impossible. For example, where students are placed in low ranked teaching groups 
they frequently cover a restricted curriculum; their teachers have systematically lower 
expectations of them; and, in many high-stakes tests in England, they are entered for 
low ‘tiered’ examinations where only a limited number of grades are available. In the 
lowest maths paper, for example, the best available grade is D: that is, less than the C 
grade that is commonly accepted as the minimum necessary for entry into the 
professions or further dedicated study at advanced level. In a study of these decisions 
in London secondary schools, it was Black students who were most likely to be placed 
in this situation: two-thirds of Black students in the schools under study (Gillborn & 
Youdell 2000). It is difficult to think of a clearer example of institutional racism than 
a test, disproportionately taken by Black students, in which the highest possible grade 
is commonly judged to be a ‘failure’.  We have to ask whether such discriminatory 
processes would be permitted if their victims were white, and especially, middle class 
whites. Ernest R. House has noted an identical situation in the US in relation to the 
practice of ‘retaining students’, i.e. holding them back a year:
‘Americans will support policies that are harmful to minorities that they would 
not tolerate if those same policies were applied to majority populations. In 
education, for example, Americans are strongly in favor of retention – 
retaining students at the same grade level for another year – even though the 
research evidence overwhelmingly shows strong negative effects … Retention 
programs are applied massively to minorities in large cities, but not to majority 
populations’ (House 1999: 2)
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In relation to the three tests I set out earlier, therefore, the English education system 
appears to be a clear case where the routine assumptions that structure the system 
encode a deep privileging of white students and, in particular, the legitimisation, 
defence and extension of Black inequity. In terms of policy priorities race equity has 
been at best a marginal concern, at worst non-existent. In relation to beneficiaries the 
picture is more complex than usually recognized (some minoritized groups do 
relatively well), but the most consistent beneficiaries are white students and, in key 
respects, Black students’ position is no better than it was when the whole reform 
movement began in the late 1980s. Finally, an examination of outcomes clearly shows 
that central reform strategies (such as the use of selection and hierarchical teaching 
groups) are known to work against race equity but are nevertheless promoted as ‘best 
practice’ for all. These reforms are known to discriminate in practice (regardless of 
intent) and are, therefore, racist in their consequences. These three tests of the system 
are by no means exhaustive but they are sufficient to establish the education system’s 
active involvement in the defence and extension of the present regime of white 
supremacy in the contemporary British state.
CONCLUSIONS
‘white-ness is a state of mind, not a complexion’.  
Malcolm X (quoted by Hare 2002: 9)
In this paper I have tried to construct a synthesis of several different arguments in 
order to arrive at a new understanding of an old problem. Critical Race Theory and 
critical work on the nature of whiteness offer a potentially important new way of 
viewing familiar issues with a fresh eye. Neither approach, however, is without its 
weaknesses and problems. Quite apart from the internal divisions between scholars 
working on different specificities of similar approaches, there are problems in the way 
that both perspectives might yet fall prey to the very mechanisms that they seek to 
critique. Gloria Ladson-Billings (1998), for example, has pointedly questioned 
whether education is too ‘nice’ a field (i.e. too majoritarian, too conservative, and too 
self-satisfied) to ever take forward such a radical challenge. Similarly Rosa 
Hernandez Sheets warns that whiteness studies threatens to become a ‘movement’ 
through which white people re-colonize the centre of multicultural education, one of 
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the few spaces carved out by people of color in the US academy (Sheets 2000). These 
are very real possibilities. But there is also the possibility that, by engaging in work of 
this kind, critical scholars can raise new questions, challenge so-called 
‘commonsense’ and disrupt the assumptions that currently shape education (in policy 
and practice).
This process of radical critique should not be confused with a prophecy of doom. To 
identify the complex and deep rooted nature of racism is not to assume that it is 
inevitable nor insurmountable (see Ansley 1997). Neither is such an analysis an attack 
on the progress already made in the struggle for greater equity: recognising how far 
we must yet travel, is not to deny that we have already moved. This perspective, 
however, insists on recognising the scale and difficulty of the task ahead. Critical 
Race Theory is frequently accused of pessimism but its recognition of contemporary 
white supremacy is intended to advance and inform the struggle for greater equity, not 
to detract from it. As Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic have asked:
‘..is [CRT] optimistic, because it believes that race is a social construction? 
(As such, it should be subject to ready change.) And if CRT does have a dark 
side [sic], what follows from that? Is medicine pessimistic because it focuses 
on diseases and traumas?’ (Delgado & Stefancic 2001: 13)
 
Drawing primarily on the work of scholars of color in the US, in this paper I have 
tried to build on the insights of both CRT and critical white studies. This approach 
rejects the commonsense (white-sense?) view of education policy and the dominant 
understanding of the functioning of education in Western societies. This critical 
perspective is based on the recognition that race inequity and racism are central 
features of the education system. These are not aberrant nor accidental phenomena 
that will be ironed out in time, they are fundamental characteristics of the system. It is  
in this sense that education policy is an act of white supremacy. To re-visit bell 
hooks’ use of the term white supremacy, the evidence shows that education policy in 
England clearly acts to ‘support and affirm the very structure of racist domination and 
oppression’ (after hooks 1989: 113). I have shown how policy assumes and defends 
white supremacy through the priorities it sets, the beneficiaries that it privileges, and 
the outcomes that it produces. Far from being the extreme and unhelpful slur that 
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many critics (of both left and right) assume the term to be, white supremacy is 
actually a wholly apt descriptor of the functioning and structure of contemporary 
education.
Finally, in view of the particular way in which race critical research uses the term 
‘white supremacy’, and its shocking connotations for some readers, it may be useful 
to add a few words on the question of intentionality. Scholarship on race inequity (in 
numerous disciplines and in many nation states) has long argued that a deliberate 
intention to discriminate is by no means a necessary requirement in order to recognise 
that an activity or policy may be racist in its consequences. This point is made 
powerfully by Kimberlé Crenshaw and her colleagues in relation to legal definitions 
of racism in the US:
‘the dominant legal conception of racism as a discrete and identifiable act of 
“prejudice based on skin color” placed virtually the entire range of everyday 
social practices in America – social practices developed and maintained 
throughout the period of formal American apartheid – beyond the scope of 
critical examination or legal remediation’ (Crenshaw et al 1995: xv) 
The situation in Britain is somewhat different. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry defined 
institutional racism as:
‘The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and 
professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. 
It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount 
to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and 
racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.’ (Macpherson 
1999, p. 28)
This definition deliberately emphasizes outcome and effect over any question of 
intent. According to this approach racism may be ‘unwitting’ but what matters is the 
outcome. This view was enshrined in the amendments to British race equity 
legislation that followed the Lawrence report. For example, the official definition of a 
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racist incident is ‘any incident which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any 
other person’ (Home Office 2000).
The amended legislation only became active in 2002 and at the time of writing no 
education cases have been tested in court. Nevertheless, early indications are far from 
encouraging: education is among the least active of all public services in relation to 
the new duties (Gillborn 2004c; Schneider-Ross 2003). Notwithstanding the 
legislation’s uncertain impact on practice, the analysis of the Stephen Lawrence 
Inquiry and the language of the amended laws remains potentially significant. Finally, 
for the time being at least, in Britain the law has moved well beyond the perennial 
claim that it is unfair to talk of racism where no offence was intended. In official 
terms, in theory at least, racism has finally been de-coupled from questions of intent. 
But the conscious intent of individual people (whether policy makers or teachers) is 
more complex than a simple dichotomy between intended and unintended outcomes.
Work on institutional racism (in the US and UK over more than three decades) has 
firmly established that even well-intentioned actions can have racist consequences. In 
a preceding paragraph I stated that the forms of institutional racism in education 
policy are not accidental: does that mean that they are deliberate? One answer might 
be that institutional racism and race inequity are deliberate insofar as (at best) there 
appears to be a judgement that their eradication is simply not important enough to 
shape the main tenets of education policy: it is possible, of course, that the situation is 
even worse than this, and that there has been a judgement that race equity is 
dangerous (electorally, where whites might turn to alternative parties) or socially and 
economically (where a Marxian/abolitionist analysis would have it that dividing the 
working class is a good way of protecting ruling class power). Either way, we know 
enough about education policy and practice to go a long way towards eradicating race 
injustice in education (funding urban schools to a realistic level; securing testing 
regimes that do not unfairly discriminate on racial lines; abandoning selective 
teaching and grouping; broadening the curriculum; diversifying the teaching force; 
and genuinely acting on the results of ethnic monitoring would all be a good start). In 
practice, however, high-stakes testing, school performance tables and selection by 
‘ability’ are all being used increasingly – despite their known detrimental impact on 
Black students. That racist measures are not only retained, but actually extended, 
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suggests that policy makers have decided (tacitly, if not explicitly) to place race 
equity at the margins – thereby retaining race injustice at the centre. 
The evidence suggests that, despite a rhetoric of standards for all, education policy in 
England is actively involved in the defence, legitimation and extension of white 
supremacy. The assumptions which feed, and are strengthened by, this regime are not 
overtly discriminatory but their effects are empirically verifiable and materially real in 
every meaningful sense. Shaped by long established cultural, economic and historical 
structures of racial domination, the continued promotion of policies and practices that 
are known to be racially divisive testifies to a tacit intentionality in the system. The 
racist outcomes of contemporary policy may not be coldly calculated but they are far 
from accidental.
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Notes
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1 In this paper the word ‘Black’ is used to signify those groups of minoritized subjects who 
would generally identify themselves with the term, and be identified by such a term; most usually 
people with family heritages that identify with Africa and/or the Caribbean.
2 My first public presentation of the central ideas in this paper was at a major education 
conference in England in the fall of 2003. A prominent white professor told me later that, although 
some of my earlier work had been ‘useful’, this talk of ‘supremacy’ meant that I had, in his words, 
‘gone mad’. 
3 I use ‘troubling’ here in the way that several scholars, particular those working in post-
structuralist and/or queer theory, have applied the term to a de-stabilizing, de-centring of commonly 
accepted assumptions and definitions: after Butler (1990), Horn (2003), Kumashiro (2001) & 
Youdell (2000). 
4 See also David R. Roediger (1992) and (1994).
5 See, for example, the interviews with Matthew Hale and Lisa Turner of the World Church of 
the Creator, in Swain & Nieli (2003).
6 For more detail on Herrnstein & Murray’s claims, and the racist pedigree of their sources 
(both intellectual and financial) see Lane (1999), Gillborn & Youdell (2000: 231) and Apple (2004: 
198-199).
  
7 For an introduction to the basic tenets of CRT see Delgado & Stefancic (2001). For a 
consideration of the links between CRT in education and British antiracist thought see Gillborn 
(forthcoming).
8 The annually published data are frequently re-tabulated by national newspapers and given 
headlines that proclaim them as a guide to the ‘top’ schools, those with the ‘highest failure rate’ and 
‘bottom of the league’ (Gillborn & Youdell 2000: Ch 2).
9 An official survey, for the Qualifications & Curriculum Authority (QCA), found that in 
2001, 10 and 11 year-olds were spending 49% of their classroom time on English and maths: see 
Mansell & Clark 2003: 2.
10 The best guide to students’ performance over this time period is the Youth Cohort Study 
(YCS), a survey of school-leavers’ achievements and experiences that has been conducted at least 
every two-years since the late 1980s. The YCS has the advantage of using large, nationally-
representative samples but it is far from perfect: sub-samples can become quite small, especially 
when trying to simultaneously examine several elements (such as gender, ethnicity and socio-
economic background). Nevertheless, it does offer a snapshot of how certain minority groups have 
performed over time.
11 A report by the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) noted that ‘the lengths of fixed-
period exclusions varied considerably in some schools between black and white pupils for what 
were described as the same or similar incidents’ (2001: 23).
12 See, for example, the reviews offered by Hallam (2002) and Wiliam & Bartholomew (2001).
